CVE-2026-98072
CVE CVE-2026-98072EUVD EUVD-2026-86725Published 2026-09-25T10:24:12.000Z
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: use wq_has_sleeper() in release_in_xmit() release_in_xmit() clears RDS_IN_XMIT with clear_bit_unlock() and then checks waitqueue_active() to decide whether anyone needs waking. clear_bit_unlock() is only a release operation: it orders the critical section before the bit clear, but does not order the subsequent plain load of the wait queue head after it. The waiter side does the mirror image - it adds itself to the wait queue and then tests the bit. That is the classic store-buffering pattern: the releasing CPU can read the wait queue as empty while the waiting CPU still reads the bit as set, so the sleeper is never woken. The waiters are rds_conn_shutdown() and rds_tcp_reset_callbacks(), both in uninterruptible wait_event() with no timeout. A lost wake-up strands the shutdown worker on its single-threaded workqueue until some other sender releases the bit again - and on a connection that is being torn down precisely because it failed, there may never be another sender. The barrier used to be there: release_in_xmit() did clear_bit() followed by smp_mb__after_atomic() until commit 1422f28826d2 ("rds: introduce acquire/release ordering in acquire/release_in_xmit()") folded both into clear_bit_unlock(), which strengthened the lock hand-off but silently dropped the full barrier the wake-up check depends on. The refill counterpart, release_refill() in net/rds/ib_recv.c, still carries its smp_mb__after_atomic() for exactly this reason. Use wq_has_sleeper(), which is waitqueue_active() preceded by the required full barrier.
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux 6.6.23 <6.7; f781fb5177cdfd9a6c98cd94e30275457c6461ac; 1422f28826d2a0c11e5240b3e951c9e214d8656e <a269795107f45adc95975a83324f8fef40bec4ce; 1422f28826d2a0c11e5240b3e951c9e214d8656e <6d0c8b7073913011459cf968cbbadd341e166bc3; 5.4.273 <5.5; 1422f28826d2a0c11e5240b3e951c9e214d8656e <3764627b30a283e611e652c4a2bb8cdc74a75a99; 5.10.214 <5.11; 6.7.11 <6.8; 52287ed416a10bc3d3e204a3186d9509ab3ee634; bec6c4ce1169a565c58c347d5d0ac22e46d507d6; 6.8.2 <6.9; 5.15.153 <5.16; patch: 7.3-rc2; 917135195200e20e5244b9c3f2bb40f3d5e02510; patch: 6.18.53; 1e1e4316fcaeb9cd6bc56c91127e88625237dd44; patch: 7.2.7; 6.9; 6.1.83 <6.2; patch: 6.12.111; 1422f28826d2a0c11e5240b3e951c9e214d8656e <ed7ee0cd0e136d02f87f13181b1a89880463c7e9; d792459a6e2ae21c7f5107babd63e52e4c5ab93a; 4a4dffdff9ea6201665f5d0a5042011d09bd527f; 8c378cc522aedd5fa5aa53486b43a4d552fbbd5c; patch: 0; 4.19.311 <4.20
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
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- Linux — Linux
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