CVE-2026-97952
CVE CVE-2026-97952EUVD EUVD-2026-86806Published 2026-09-25T10:23:00.000Z
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunvdc: unmap LDC cookies when the descriptor send fails __send_request() maps the request's pages into the LDC channel's map table (ldc_map_sg()), fills in the descriptor and marks it VIO_DESC_READY before ringing the doorbell via __vdc_tx_trigger(). When the trigger fails, the error path only prints a message: the descriptor stays READY and the cookies are never unmapped. The mapping is normally released in vdc_end_one() when the peer completes the descriptor - but a descriptor whose doorbell was never sent will never complete, and since dr->prod is not advanced on failure, the reset path (vdc_requeue_inflight(), which walks [cons, prod)) never visits it either. The map table entries are leaked permanently. Since commit a11f6ca9aef9 ("sunvdc: Do not spin in an infinite loop when vio_ldc_send() returns EAGAIN") trigger failures occur in practice under load, so every resulting I/O error also leaks one request's worth of entries from the fixed-size (8192 entries per channel) map table. Because the allocator hands out contiguous ranges, fragmentation makes large multi-segment requests fail first as the table drains, until ldc_map_sg() fails permanently and the disk is dead until reboot. It also makes any retry-based recovery unusable: requeuing the request on -EAGAIN remaps the pages on every attempt, overwriting desc->cookies and orphaning the previous mapping, so the table drains at the retry rate. This is the memory exhaustion observed when the requeue approach was first tested in October 2025. Roll back on failure: unmap the cookies, mark the descriptor FREE again and clear the request entry. If the trigger failed with -ENOTCONN, __vdc_tx_trigger() has already reset the port, which tears down and reallocates both the dring and the LDC channel including its map table - nothing to roll back, and the stale descriptor must not be touched.
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux 4.4.175 <4.5; a11f6ca9aef989b56cd31ff4ee2af4fb31a172ec <0c6da21fa35e03fc74f09895433ccd6d4a9c3530; 3e380fc2ae4d18210eec9c472b12e2b2544f7dc1; patch: 7.2.7; 4.19.21 <4.20; patch: 6.12.111; a11f6ca9aef989b56cd31ff4ee2af4fb31a172ec <ab81a5c1014a38dab0fb402609fd866b0bcb4726; patch: 6.18.53; 3fbba4e55051d01a72b56ea192064175924bf56a; 7ab4b6526fdcdfa7772984bbcd2ac4fd14fa223b; a1ef7d5da9b2c145f811a80bb8197df6037a7572; 4.20.8 <4.21; a11f6ca9aef989b56cd31ff4ee2af4fb31a172ec <f3322baa3a8ac87730feae952c1146269d78e098; 4.9.156 <4.10; patch: 0; patch: 7.3-rc3; 627e656239c63d8a81672d08de7885e89c12fa75; a11f6ca9aef989b56cd31ff4ee2af4fb31a172ec <57835952566f0be9b365a6eb3a70b397a9d5ef47; 4.14.99 <4.15; 5.0
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
An estate covering these products can be recorded in Patchlage. An advisory about them appears in the next morning's situation report.
- Linux — Linux
Does this concern one of your customers?
This page cannot answer that — it does not know your estate. Whoever has recorded their environments gets the answer the morning after publication, together with a paragraph they can forward to the customer unedited.
Try it for 28 daysPatchlage reports hits and suspected hits. About everything else this system says nothing — neither this page nor the situation report ever claims that an estate is safe.