CVE-2026-97603

CVE CVE-2026-97603EUVD EUVD-2026-86734Published 2026-09-25T10:22:16.000Z

What the advisory describes

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: idpf: disable DIM work before freeing q_vectors idpf never drains the Tx/Rx DIM works before freeing the memory they live in. tx_dim and rx_dim are embedded in struct idpf_q_vector, they are queued from the NAPI poll via net_dim(), and idpf_vport_intr_rel() ends with kfree(rsrc->q_vectors). Nothing in the driver cancels them. idpf_tx_dim_work() and idpf_rx_dim_work() then run on freed memory: idpf_vport_intr_write_itr() writes the ITR register through q_vector->intr_reg.tx_itr / rx_itr, void __iomem pointers loaded out of the freed q_vector. No configuration is needed to get there -- IDPF_ITR_IS_DYNAMIC() is defined as (itr_mode) and idpf_vport_alloc() initialises both modes to IDPF_ITR_DYNAMIC. Draining after idpf_vport_intr_napi_dis_all() is not enough on its own. idpf_net_dim() is called from inside the "if (napi_complete_done(napi, work_done))" branch of the poll, and napi_complete_done() has already cleared NAPIF_STATE_SCHED by then. napi_disable_locked() waits only while (val & (NAPIF_STATE_SCHED | NAPIF_STATE_NPSVC)), so napi_disable() can return while the poll tail is still queueing the work, and a plain cancel_work_sync() would be re-armed behind the drain. Use disable_work_sync(): schedule_work() on a work with a non-zero disable count is dropped by clear_pending_if_disabled() before __queue_work() is reached. Move idpf_init_dim() to idpf_vport_intr_alloc() so the works are initialised on every path that can reach the drain -- the three "goto intr_deinit" sites between idpf_vport_intr_init() and idpf_vport_intr_ena() get there without the enable side having run. Nothing re-enables them: rsrc->q_vectors is freed on every exit from idpf_vport_open() and on every idpf_vport_stop(), so the count dies with the object. It is a race, not a deterministic failure -- net_dim() only schedules once DIM_NEVENTS events have accumulated and the profile index changes. A KASAN ifup/ifdown loop under load is the way to see it.

Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.

Products the advisory names

These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.

• Linux — Linux 6.7; patch: 6.18.53; c2d548cad1508d334517bcbd7cd5c915cc831fc0 <cd7a1598645b6917a8676b7e2efe8d97ce68a952; c2d548cad1508d334517bcbd7cd5c915cc831fc0 <7e4312953788244d47074987d40d76702cf929f1; patch: 7.2.7; c2d548cad1508d334517bcbd7cd5c915cc831fc0 <7dd4c829bac2916be98a3e34b41daaba7f42b4c4; patch: 7.3-rc3; patch: 0

The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.

Carried in the product catalogue

An estate covering these products can be recorded in Patchlage. An advisory about them appears in the next morning's situation report.

• Linux — Linux

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