CVE-2026-93206
CVE CVE-2026-93206EUVD EUVD-2026-85935Published 2026-09-24T15:10:29.000ZLast changed 2026-09-25T12:42:35.000Z
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI/proc: Use file_ns_capable() when checking config space read access proc_bus_pci_read() decides how much of the config space is readable based on capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), which checks the credentials of the task calling read(), not the credentials of the process that opened the file. The sysfs equivalent, pci_read_config(), has checked the credentials of the opening process since commit de139a339395 ("pci: check caps from sysfs file open to read device dependent config space"), so a privileged process can open the config space file and pass the file descriptor to an unprivileged process (for example, a process running a KVM guest with an assigned device), which can then read the entire config space. The check was subsequently routed through the LSM framework in commit 47970b1b2aa6 ("pci: use security_capable() when checking capablities during config space read") and converted to the dedicated helper in commit ab0fa82b2df9 ("pci-sysfs: use proper file capability helper function"). Thus, the two interfaces check the same capability against different credentials. Checking the credentials of the task calling read() makes the outcome depend on who reads rather than who opened, so the restriction is bypassed whenever a more privileged process reads through the descriptor. Checking the credentials recorded in file->f_cred settles the decision at open() time and ties it to the file, where it cannot change with the caller. Use file_ns_capable() to check CAP_SYS_ADMIN against the credentials in effect when the file was opened, bringing the procfs interface in line with the sysfs behaviour. As a result, a file descriptor opened by a privileged process and passed to an unprivileged one now allows the entire config space to be read through procfs, matching sysfs.
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux patch: 6.18.50; 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <e7730acd6a01c5931a3afb83639810ff2fb9cc92; 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <c2d4174f492458ecdcdef309243624999612d526; patch: 5.10.270; patch: 7.2.4; patch: 6.1.188; 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <77272b7fd0e472086fd626a1fcd11da625822cc2; patch: 6.12.109; patch: 5.15.221; 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <8a3a54aa3e65ed76f8560a387243a7738ae0cb1c; 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <5c7ab4ca66f0880cffc3735555ea719dd5253726; patch: 7.3-rc1; 2.6.12; 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <f82f53e75eff382fc8f56b73279b54f7cf5a5c65; patch: 0; patch: 6.6.157; 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <6351e94076329dab517ea94c115e15c4d8459381; 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <53407535d49ec034e476121020b5c878f0d92e18
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
An estate covering these products can be recorded in Patchlage. An advisory about them appears in the next morning's situation report.
- Linux — Linux
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