CVE-2026-89984
CVE CVE-2026-89984EUVD EUVD-2026-80584Published 2026-09-16T10:33:00.000Z
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86/intel: Fix kernel address leakages in LBR stack Before Arch LBR gained CPL filtering support, a user-only branch stack could still contain kernel addresses. As a result, kernel branch records may be exposed to user space even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. For example, on Intel Tiger Lake, the following command can still report SYSRET/ERET entries with kernel-space from addresses: $ ./perf record -e cycles:p -o - --branch-filter any,save_type,u -- \ ./perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \ ./perf script -i - --fields brstack|tr ' ' '\n'| \ grep -E '0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}' Total time: 0.000 [sec] 0.219000 usecs/op 4,566,210 ops/sec [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.551 MB - ] 0xffffffff93c001c8/0x7f12a2b1d647/P/-/-/16959/SYSRET/- 0xffffffff93c001c8/0x7f12a2b1d5c2/P/-/-/17535/SYSRET/- 0xffffffff93c01928/0x7f12a2861000/P/-/-/6719/ERET/- 0xffffffff93c01928/0x7f12a297a000/P/-/-/8575/ERET/- The problem is that intel_pmu_lbr_filter() does not fully validate the privilege level of sampled entries. It filters some mismatches based on the branch type and the to address, but it does not reject entries whose from address violates the requested branch privilege filter. Fix this by extending software filtering to validate both from and to addresses against br_sel. Any LBR entry contains kernel address does not match the requested user filter is dropped. This prevents kernel addresses from appearing in user-only branch stacks.
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux 47125db27e47e9d44c878bf8925aa057824bb0d5 <b589147f54adc62e4172e4acf079ad5fb7b3687f; patch: 6.18.51; patch: 7.3-rc1; patch: 5.10.270; patch: 7.2.5; patch: 6.1.188; patch: 6.6.157; patch: 0; 47125db27e47e9d44c878bf8925aa057824bb0d5 <be0628a101ac05b085aaa4f650d48bd3915e80fa; patch: 5.15.221; 47125db27e47e9d44c878bf8925aa057824bb0d5 <6ac26161db27f7fb9d9e89ae240dbe52795496cc; 47125db27e47e9d44c878bf8925aa057824bb0d5 <e2b0575900ff72aa82748af96e7bd564ade5157a; 5.9; patch: 6.12.110; 47125db27e47e9d44c878bf8925aa057824bb0d5 <ca19a175e89b7de604fab736436cbab74030b47a; 47125db27e47e9d44c878bf8925aa057824bb0d5 <3c492c8eba02698ca893a9a13388d2adf6dfb839; 47125db27e47e9d44c878bf8925aa057824bb0d5 <f3705db4e6378cc1b91a38ce0fe2f879055e23ca; 47125db27e47e9d44c878bf8925aa057824bb0d5 <68c4b780b266a435261a1e029bede5ee3c2735cc
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
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- Linux — Linux
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