CVE-2026-89607
CVE CVE-2026-89607EUVD EUVD-2026-76519Published 2026-09-11T19:45:09.000ZLast changed 2026-09-14T12:01:27.000ZCVSS 7.8
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ecryptfs: reject oversized encrypted_key_size in parse_tag_3_packet parse_tag_3_packet() set encrypted_key_size from the Tag 3 packet body without bounding it against ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES (64). When encrypted_key_size > 64, decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key() sets decrypted_key_size = encrypted_key_size and performs two out-of-bounds writes: 1. crypto_skcipher_decrypt() writes encrypted_key_size bytes into decrypted_key[64] via scatterlist, overflowing into the parent ecryptfs_auth_tok struct. 2. memcpy(crypt_stat->key, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size) writes into crypt_stat->key[64], corrupting root_iv, keysig_list, and mutexes in ecryptfs_crypt_stat. Only AES-192 (cipher code 0x08) enables this because it sets crypt_stat->key_size = 24 independently of encrypted_key_size, allowing crypto_skcipher_setkey() to succeed while encrypted_key_size exceeds ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES. The PKI decryption path (parse_tag_65_packet) already validates decrypted_key_size <= ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES; the passphrase path omits this check. Bound encrypted_key_size against ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES (64) rather than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES (512). The 64-byte limit also protects the 512-byte encrypted_key[] buffer, so the former 512-byte check is removed as redundant. [tyhicks: Adjust the code comment to refer to macros representing the buffer sizes rather than mentioning the buffer size values since they may change in the future]
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux 2.6.19; 237fead619984cc48818fe12ee0ceada3f55b012 <5babe9c177c364521e3e682b949c5a8c47f4a441; 237fead619984cc48818fe12ee0ceada3f55b012 <33e050cac841498b5175f0f385eee903fd98863c; patch: 7.2.4; 237fead619984cc48818fe12ee0ceada3f55b012 <ccd13eff0e7356d2aa28b127b577e4e5ad4563f5; 237fead619984cc48818fe12ee0ceada3f55b012 <14cb36a500a5a3afbc955dbf69dabc565f1a3b26; patch: 6.12.109; patch: 7.3-rc1; 237fead619984cc48818fe12ee0ceada3f55b012 <d2802414081184f79a619ede178aeef3aa989793; patch: 5.10.270; patch: 5.15.221; patch: 6.18.50; 237fead619984cc48818fe12ee0ceada3f55b012 <a419c9ebfc9a40ee56aaad6dc68bfd67d400817b; patch: 0; patch: 6.1.188; 237fead619984cc48818fe12ee0ceada3f55b012 <e2152d491ae62d96a32ed59778680a242af1fbc6; 237fead619984cc48818fe12ee0ceada3f55b012 <2cd21340163494d312836c77c9fbfe2530b3d075; patch: 6.6.157
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
An estate covering these products can be recorded in Patchlage. An advisory about them appears in the next morning's situation report.
- Linux — Linux
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