CVE-2026-89538
CVE CVE-2026-89538EUVD EUVD-2026-76449Published 2026-09-11T19:44:15.000ZLast changed 2026-09-14T12:00:46.000ZCVSS 9.8
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Reject krb5 v2 wrap tokens with oversized ec field gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() sets buf->len to a logical length, which can be much smaller than head[0].iov_len (the allocated receive-page capacity). It then calls xdr_buf_trim() with a trim length derived from the 16-bit "extra count" (ec) field in the Kerberos v2 token header. The ec field is authenticated by the post-decrypt memcmp() against the encrypted header copy, so a randomly-mutated value is rejected. However, any peer holding a valid GSS context can legitimately encrypt a token whose ec exceeds the plaintext length. Per RFC 4121, such a token is structurally malformed. Although xdr_buf_trim() now clamps the buf->len subtraction to avoid unsigned underflow, the buffer is still left in a semantically invalid state (zero length, inconsistent iov lengths) when ec is oversized. Reject these tokens before calling xdr_buf_trim(), giving callers a well-defined GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN error and keeping the xdr_buf internally consistent. The wrapped blob begins at a nonzero offset -- both callers pass len as offset + opaque_len -- so buf->len still counts the offset bytes that precede the blob. Compare the trim length against the remaining wrapped segment, buf->len - offset, rather than the whole buffer; comparing against buf->len alone leaves an offset-wide window in which an oversized ec passes the test and xdr_buf_trim() cuts into the bytes ahead of the blob.
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux cf4c024b908353fcc48309374d39e3399d67dfd1 <880effc943ed82d6811f272ed3307c222b40f4d6; cf4c024b908353fcc48309374d39e3399d67dfd1 <4abb44a29bb515df6f49123848765c70fc9b5021; cf4c024b908353fcc48309374d39e3399d67dfd1 <ad484748eec0a66eac0f13ab53b3fbedb7333c91; cf4c024b908353fcc48309374d39e3399d67dfd1 <1f9856af065b6158271687e9788407b9573fd16f; 3.13; patch: 5.10.270; patch: 0; patch: 6.1.188; patch: 6.18.50; patch: 7.3-rc1; patch: 6.12.109; patch: 6.6.157; patch: 5.15.221; cf4c024b908353fcc48309374d39e3399d67dfd1 <ac9efc29346b6942e71f0e24a3178a9121330fab; patch: 7.2.4; cf4c024b908353fcc48309374d39e3399d67dfd1 <b5746095b59f4d11f39f08751d36bbdfd1e5deac; cf4c024b908353fcc48309374d39e3399d67dfd1 <dfcd81ab45613d45996fbf483d4ef54b0ec90ab9; cf4c024b908353fcc48309374d39e3399d67dfd1 <9fc6d6e6db49ab55208d5dd1c424c1d0d9aa7296
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
An estate covering these products can be recorded in Patchlage. An advisory about them appears in the next morning's situation report.
- Linux — Linux
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