CVE-2026-80806

CVE CVE-2026-80806EUVD EUVD-2026-71241Published 2026-09-04T15:13:20.000Z

What the advisory describes

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: don't enable DAX on new encrypted files Currently, when a new encrypted regular file is created, the call to ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=true) in __ext4_new_inode() is made before EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT is set. As a result, it can set S_DAX if the filesystem is mounted with "-o dax=always". EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT then actually gets set a bit later in __ext4_new_inode(), when it calls fscrypt_set_context() which calls ext4_set_context(). ext4_set_context() sets EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT and calls ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=false) to set S_ENCRYPTED too. This was intended to clear S_DAX as well. However, this was broken by commit 043546e46dc7 ("fs/ext4: Only change S_DAX on inode load"). This causes data written to the file to bypass encryption, also causing xfstests failures such as generic/548 (when "-o dax=always" is used). Fix this by simplifying the flow by making __ext4_new_inode() set EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT earlier. This makes it take effect in ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=true), making S_DAX never be set. Similarly, make EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA never be set in the first place on new encrypted inodes. Then it doesn't need to be cleared. As a result of these simplifications, ext4_set_context() no longer needs to change inode flags or state when 'handle != NULL'. Remove that too.

Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.

Products the advisory names

These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.

Linux — Linux 5.8; 043546e46dc70c25ff7e2cf6d09cbb0424fc9978 <ed1cd834da65db127f1c30ff67e78f14825a06c1; 043546e46dc70c25ff7e2cf6d09cbb0424fc9978 <5959cad3cfa852ec07bbdaf9c17f4838a94a8e6c; 043546e46dc70c25ff7e2cf6d09cbb0424fc9978 <e27bae352158c007143d5bb50f3af33a177c0a37; patch: 0; 043546e46dc70c25ff7e2cf6d09cbb0424fc9978 <a13f61ba9b2a7a4ff1f140949ccfad23c5313757; patch: 6.18.47; patch: 7.3-rc1; patch: 6.12.108; 043546e46dc70c25ff7e2cf6d09cbb0424fc9978 <458776af0061afec1014cb3cd0061e282e482e83; 043546e46dc70c25ff7e2cf6d09cbb0424fc9978 <da32af420d6d466e247c43ac0b829edeac7ae0ad; patch: 5.15.220; patch: 5.10.269; 043546e46dc70c25ff7e2cf6d09cbb0424fc9978 <3392391b363a63ebb531d45318a729b1c998565b; patch: 6.1.187; 043546e46dc70c25ff7e2cf6d09cbb0424fc9978 <f53b325068bca0b238c3e0d2eb7de9b1f2268cab; 043546e46dc70c25ff7e2cf6d09cbb0424fc9978 <add98959b220935b243170214c787bc03044a44d; patch: 6.6.156; patch: 7.1.11; patch: 7.2.1

The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.

Carried in the product catalogue

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Linux — Linux

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