CVE-2026-80796

CVE CVE-2026-80796EUVD EUVD-2026-71439Published 2026-09-04T15:13:09.000Z

What the advisory describes

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep() and nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep() read an inner length byte from the NCI RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF payload and use it to memcpy() into fixed kernel buffers, but neither function receives the caller-validated activation_params_len. A crafted NCI notification with activation_params_len=1 and an inner length byte of up to 20 (NFC-A) or 50 (NFC-B) causes memcpy() to read that many bytes past the one valid byte in the activation params region -- a slab out-of-bounds read of kernel memory adjacent to the NCI skb. The sibling nci_extract_rf_params_*() family was given equivalent protection by commit 571dcbeb8e63 ("net: nfc: nci: Fix parameter validation for packet data"), but the two activation parameter extractors were not updated at that time. Add a data_len parameter to both functions, guard against an empty region before consuming the inner length byte, decrement the remaining count after consuming it, and clamp the copy length to what is actually available. Update both call sites to pass ntf.activation_params_len, which is already validated against the skb at ntf.c:801.

Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.

Products the advisory names

These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.

• Linux — Linux patch: 5.10.269; e8c0dacd9836dc2dcb28d236c9cc3cfaa9965a20 <f5c534b53f8c424a8e7633c9b585475c4bf4ee18; patch: 5.15.220; patch: 7.1.11; patch: 6.12.108; e8c0dacd9836dc2dcb28d236c9cc3cfaa9965a20 <04e51353cb9fa321caaeeed8331d4cd041fbaca7; e8c0dacd9836dc2dcb28d236c9cc3cfaa9965a20 <e25b44bd8b8cc666b49a3fe0ef547e64d5b1e300; patch: 6.18.47; e8c0dacd9836dc2dcb28d236c9cc3cfaa9965a20 <9620a91f8d643b680f417a435db399a04d1e06d8; e8c0dacd9836dc2dcb28d236c9cc3cfaa9965a20 <be311c0cfeadfbe815ea22d2914a98d06e3fab0e; e8c0dacd9836dc2dcb28d236c9cc3cfaa9965a20 <9b01f5af0dc59263b59391b148bc78d83c0354a9; e8c0dacd9836dc2dcb28d236c9cc3cfaa9965a20 <1168484fe2b3828bf24a46f3c42a8719fade679b; patch: 6.1.187; patch: 0; patch: 7.2.1; patch: 7.3-rc1; e8c0dacd9836dc2dcb28d236c9cc3cfaa9965a20 <0428fa2c22e2ba0cff766d3b80d461e149102045; e8c0dacd9836dc2dcb28d236c9cc3cfaa9965a20 <cf9d44be50b9074a5abdc301b4a3ba3e283591df; patch: 6.6.156; 3.3

The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.

Carried in the product catalogue

An estate covering these products can be recorded in Patchlage. An advisory about them appears in the next morning's situation report.

• Linux — Linux

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