CVE-2026-80712
CVE CVE-2026-80712EUVD EUVD-2026-67447Published 2026-08-28T06:53:11.000ZLast changed 2026-08-29T06:22:28.000ZCVSS 8.4
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: spi-qpic-snand: write the feature value before executing SET_FEATURE qcom_spi_send_cmdaddr() programs NAND_FLASH_CMD/NAND_EXEC_CMD and submits the descriptors, which makes the controller execute the command immediately. For SPINAND_SET_FEATURE the value to be written is only placed into NAND_FLASH_FEATURES afterwards, by qcom_spi_io_op(), in a second submission - so the chip is programmed with whatever that register happened to hold from a previous operation, and the intended value is only applied by the *next* SET_FEATURE. Measured on a TP-Link Archer AX55 v1 (IPQ5018, ESMT F50L1G41LB): writing 0x40 to the configuration register (0xb0) leaves the chip at 0x00, and the subsequent write of 0x00 leaves it at 0x40 - every write lands one operation late. This stayed unnoticed until v6.18 added SPI-NAND OTP support together with OTP entries for ESMT chips. spinand_otp_rw() enables OTP mode, reads, and disables it again, and mtd_otp_nvmem_add() does this during MTD registration. With the off-by-one, the "disable" write actually applies the previously requested value, so CFG_OTP_ENABLE ends up set: the chip stays in OTP mode, every subsequent array read returns the OTP area instead of the array (UBI reports an empty device) and all writes fail with -EIO because the OTP area is write protected. On this board that makes the whole flash unusable and the device unbootable. Write the feature value into NAND_FLASH_FEATURES as part of the same transaction, before NAND_EXEC_CMD. While at it, copy only the bytes the operation actually carries - the previous code dereferenced a 4-byte pointer on a one-byte buffer (spinand->scratchbuf). With this patch the flash contents read back bit-identical to a known-good dump of the same board taken under the vendor firmware (md5-verified across partitions), and writes work.
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux patch: 0; 6.15; patch: 6.18.44; patch: 7.1.8; 7304d1909080ef0c9da703500a97f46c98393fcd <8fd62901d6bf03f274a49dd0060793cc07dd51b0; 7304d1909080ef0c9da703500a97f46c98393fcd <581e5166f0780103dc91c0d8ebc801f9af4824b0; patch: 7.2; 7304d1909080ef0c9da703500a97f46c98393fcd <3ba021079ef2ac6e21e3547328496ac42d22b56a
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
An estate covering these products can be recorded in Patchlage. An advisory about them appears in the next morning's situation report.
- Linux — Linux
Does this concern one of your customers?
This page cannot answer that — it does not know your estate. Whoever has recorded their environments gets the answer the morning after publication, together with a paragraph they can forward to the customer unedited.
Try it for 28 daysPatchlage reports hits and suspected hits. About everything else this system says nothing — neither this page nor the situation report ever claims that an estate is safe.