CVE-2026-74650
CVE CVE-2026-74650EUVD EUVD-2026-64587Published 2026-08-22T15:32:26.000ZLast changed 2026-08-27T12:39:54.000Z
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler() WMM_param_handler() copies a fixed-size WMM parameter element out of a received information element without checking that the element is long enough, causing an out-of-bounds read for a short WMM IE. The handler reads sizeof(struct WMM_para_element) (18) bytes at pIE->data + 6, so it requires pIE->length to be at least 24 (WLAN_WMM_LEN), but it never validates the length. Two of its three callers reach it after matching only the WMM OUI: OnAssocRsp() in rtw_mlme_ext.c matches a 6-byte OUI, and join_cmd_hdl() matches a 4-byte OUI, before calling the handler. A vendor-specific IE carrying the WMM OUI but a length between 6 and 23, placed in an association response or in the IE blob handed to join_cmd_hdl(), passes the OUI check and then makes the memcmp() and memcpy() at pIE->data + 6 read past the end of the element. OnAssocRsp() parses a frame received from the AP, so this is reachable from a remote peer. The remaining caller in rtw_wlan_util.c already guards the handler with "pIE->length == WLAN_WMM_LEN". Move the equivalent check into the handler itself so every caller is covered; the sibling IE handlers in the same parsing loop (HT_caps_handler(), HT_info_handler(), ERP_IE_handler()) likewise bound their accesses by pIE->length.
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux patch: 6.12.104; 4.12; patch: 0; 554c0a3abf216c991c5ebddcdb2c08689ecd290b <5df2fd06567df5f178c8faae0bdaefd203618d21; 554c0a3abf216c991c5ebddcdb2c08689ecd290b <ce2399717de242344880044b91a20a712644fdfb; patch: 6.1.183; patch: 5.15.216; patch: 7.1.9; 554c0a3abf216c991c5ebddcdb2c08689ecd290b <e429c6dfd5d2324cd866daaf4c29d5cfe4dea0e4; 554c0a3abf216c991c5ebddcdb2c08689ecd290b <ae21407350151bddfd4fea7aa39bd0643c0ca9d3; 554c0a3abf216c991c5ebddcdb2c08689ecd290b <e5b7610008f4e6a80c8b071aa77ddbd5e17ea472; patch: 5.10.267; patch: 6.6.152; 554c0a3abf216c991c5ebddcdb2c08689ecd290b <6cdca4c8b64c15a3ab9ad7a85f482e9519eadf93; patch: 6.18.45; 554c0a3abf216c991c5ebddcdb2c08689ecd290b <1158b9931207392d6dd136aa0c4be18893b50fa1; 554c0a3abf216c991c5ebddcdb2c08689ecd290b <2bee6f7a0f0125238951e31da2e96d06fe359043; patch: 7.2
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
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- Linux — Linux
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