CVE-2026-74612
CVE CVE-2026-74612EUVD EUVD-2026-64549Published 2026-08-22T15:31:58.000ZLast changed 2026-08-25T05:40:38.000ZCVSS 10.0
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment veth exposes non-linear skb fragments through an xdp_buff. If an XDP program adjusts the fragment area, veth_xdp_rcv_skb() copies xdp_frags_size back to skb->data_len but leaves skb->len containing the old fragment contribution. After a fragment shrink, this makes skb_headlen() larger than the actual linear area. In the reproduced UDP receive path, __skb_datagram_iter() copied 1024 bytes past the actual linear tail to userspace, starting at struct skb_shared_info. The copied bytes included the affected skb's nr_frags, xdp_frags_size, and a kernel pointer from skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0]. Real packet data was displaced by the same amount and truncated at the end. Subtract the old data_len before replacing it and add the new data_len afterwards, keeping skb->len and skb->data_len synchronized. Additionally, bpf_xdp_pull_data() can advance data_end while leaving frags present. The skb is then still non-linear, so the old __skb_put(skb, off) triggers SKB_LINEAR_ASSERT(). Use skb_set_tail_pointer() and update skb->len explicitly instead, following bpf_prog_run_generic_xdp(). Unlike __skb_put(), skb_set_tail_pointer() does not require a linear skb. A 60000-byte UDP datagram on a veth pair with MTU 64000 was shortened by 1024 bytes from its fragment area. Before the fix, all 10 runs produced corrupted payloads. After the fix, all 10 runs matched the expected payload exactly. A forced-tailroom reproducer also exercises bpf_xdp_pull_data() with frags still present; the old code triggers SKB_LINEAR_ASSERT(), while this fix passes 10/10 runs.
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux patch: 6.12.104; patch: 7.2; 718a18a0c8a67f97781e40bdef7cdd055c430996 <2f2a7f3f8b9f1bffc9b0488aa02b6951b2aec139; 718a18a0c8a67f97781e40bdef7cdd055c430996 <cdf745b7a777f87f51666e5d8f4c6fc279bcf54d; patch: 0; 718a18a0c8a67f97781e40bdef7cdd055c430996 <0c3024afabb8064b141f3cedcb1ddd6ab05ad9d5; patch: 7.1.9; 5.18; patch: 6.18.45; patch: 6.1.184; 718a18a0c8a67f97781e40bdef7cdd055c430996 <3205b0652a37255dbb7ca8f3d942c8d8aa677c21; patch: 6.6.152; 718a18a0c8a67f97781e40bdef7cdd055c430996 <cb6379feaaff11c4e1e79c26c745ffa23182768a; 718a18a0c8a67f97781e40bdef7cdd055c430996 <41b96667d42b74bb4b137f1bb78b611a953c5943
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
An estate covering these products can be recorded in Patchlage. An advisory about them appears in the next morning's situation report.
- Linux — Linux
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