CVE-2026-72897
CVE CVE-2026-72897EUVD EUVD-2026-89008Published 2026-09-29T15:32:18.000ZLast changed 2026-09-29T17:16:38.000ZCVSS 7.5
What the advisory describes
Issue summary: A TLS server that calls SSL_set_SSL_CTX() to switch a connection to a different SSL_CTX part way through a handshake may access memory beyond the end of an internal array if the replacement context knows about more provider signature algorithms than the context the connection was created from. Applications which never call SSL_set_SSL_CTX() are not affected. Impact summary: A remote peer may be able to cause a small out-of-bounds read, and in some circumstances a fixed-value out-of-bounds write, on the server heap. This may lead to a Denial of Service. CWE: CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write Description: A TLS connection records how many certificate slots it has when it is created, taken from the SSL_CTX that created it: the built-in certificate types plus one slot for each provider TLS-SIGALG entry that context was aware of. That count sizes an internal array of per-slot certificate validity flags. An application may replace a connection's SSL_CTX part way through the handshake by calling SSL_set_SSL_CTX(), most commonly from a servername callback in order to serve a different virtual host. Doing so did not refresh the recorded count. A provider signature algorithm's slot index is its position in the list of whichever context resolves it, so if the replacement context is aware of more of them than the original, an algorithm offered by the peer can resolve to an index beyond the end of the array. Processing the peer's signature algorithms then reads one four byte word past the end for each such algorithm and, where the word read is zero, writes a fixed value over it. A peer offering many of them can corrupt heap metadata and abort the process. Only provider signature algorithms which occupy one of the excess slots, and which the server also has configured, have this effect. Codepoints the replacement context does not recognise are discarded without being resolved to a slot, and provider signature algorithms are usable only from TLS 1.3. The two contexts must therefore be aware of different numbers of provider signature algorithms, which requires separate library contexts, a provider loaded between the two being created, or providers which differ in what they advertise - in 4.0, for example, the default provider advertises SM2 where the FIPS provider does not. A deployment meeting the condition is also unable to negotiate the affected algorithms with legitimate clients, since the same stale count hides the corresponding certificates, so the misconfiguration is likely to be noticed. For that reason, and because the configuration is not the default, this issue has been assessed as Low severity. FIPS impact: no No FIPS modules are affected by this issue as the affected code is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- OpenSSL — OpenSSL 3.5.0 <3.5.9; 3.4.0 <3.4.8; 3.6.0 <3.6.5; 4.0.0 <4.0.3
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
An estate covering these products can be recorded in Patchlage. An advisory about them appears in the next morning's situation report.
- OpenSSL — OpenSSL
Does this concern one of your customers?
This page cannot answer that — it does not know your estate. Whoever has recorded their environments gets the answer the morning after publication, together with a paragraph they can forward to the customer unedited.
Try it for 28 daysPatchlage reports hits and suspected hits. About everything else this system says nothing — neither this page nor the situation report ever claims that an estate is safe.