CVE-2026-72340
CVE CVE-2026-72340EUVD EUVD-2026-59239Published 2026-08-15T05:55:47.000ZLast changed 2026-08-17T05:42:59.000ZCVSS 7.8
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block The VCAP instances on a chip are not independent, yet they are locked independently. On sparx5 and lan969x the IS0 and IS2 instances are backed by the same Super VCAP hardware block and share its cache and command registers: every access drives the shared VCAP_SUPER_CTRL register and moves data through the shared cache registers. Accessing one instance therefore races with accessing another. The per-instance admin->lock cannot prevent this, as each instance takes a different lock. The locking issue is mostly disguised by the fact that the core usage of the vcap api runs under rtnl. However, the full rule dump in debugfs decodes rules straight from hardware (a READ command followed by a cache read) and runs outside rtnl, so it races a concurrent tc-flower rule write to another Super VCAP instance. Besides corrupting the dump, the read repopulates the shared cache between the writers cache fill and its write command, so the writer commits the wrong data and corrupts the hardware entry. Introduce vcap_lock() and vcap_unlock() helpers and route every rule lock site in the VCAP API and its debugfs code through them. Replace the per-instance admin->lock with a single mutex in struct vcap_control that serializes access to all instances. The helpers reach it through a new admin->vctrl back-pointer, and the clients initialise and destroy the control lock instead of a per-instance one. No path holds more than one instance lock, so collapsing them onto a single mutex cannot self-deadlock.
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux patch: 0; 71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 <49806bef9572a2e012610517bc14ed0a4db0d1fc; patch: 7.2; 71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 <d7a8d500d7e42837bd8dce40cb52c97c6e8706a9; 6.2; 71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 <786456d0a244bbd405dfc60e4de51f8b348b9cb1; 71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 <952928564cc5fdb06f92d7e25c6cd2e1d816362b; patch: 6.12.97; 71c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26 <1e71a40d101547380590db582213c1f1dce1f041; patch: 6.6.145; patch: 7.1.5; patch: 6.18.40
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
An estate covering these products can be recorded in Patchlage. An advisory about them appears in the next morning's situation report.
- Linux — Linux
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