CVE-2026-72043
CVE CVE-2026-72043EUVD EUVD-2026-59001Published 2026-08-15T05:52:02.000ZLast changed 2026-08-17T05:39:42.000ZCVSS 7.1
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: Fix missing dirty page tracking in {pte,pmd}_wrprotect() When hardware page table walker (PTW) is enabled on LoongArch, the CPU may set _PAGE_DIRTY directly in the page table entry during a write TLB miss, without going through the software TLB store handler. The software TLB store handler (tlbex.S:254) sets both _PAGE_DIRTY and_PAGE_MODIFIED together: ori t0, t0, (_PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_MODIFIED) Since hardware PTW only sets _PAGE_DIRTY, the software-only bit, i.e. _PAGE_MODIFIED is left unchanged. This creates a window where a PTE has _PAGE_DIRTY set (hardware knows the page is dirty) but _PAGE_MODIFIED clear (software is unaware). When fork()/clone() triggers copy-on-write, __copy_present_ptes() calls pte_wrprotect(), which unconditionally clears both the _PAGE_WRITE and _PAGE_DIRTY bits: pte_val(pte) &= ~(_PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_DIRTY); Since _PAGE_MODIFIED was never set, the dirtiness information is lost completely. Subsequently, when memory pressure triggers page reclaim, page_mkclean() / try_to_unmap() sees the page as clean (i.e. pte_dirty() returns false) and the page may be freed without writeback, causing data corruption. Fix this by propagating the _PAGE_DIRTY bit to the _PAGE_MODIFIED bit in both pte_wrprotect() and pmd_wrprotect() before clearing writeable bits: if (pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY) pte_val(pte) |= _PAGE_MODIFIED; The pmd_wrprotect() fix handles the CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE case, where pmd entries need the same treatment. This ensures the software dirty tracking bit (checked by pte_dirty() and pmd_dirty(), which read both the _PAGE_DIRTY and _PAGE_MODIFIED bits) is preserved across fork COW write-protection. The issue was found by the LTP madvise09 test case, which exercises page reclaim after "madvise(MADV_FREE), write and fork" operation sequence on private anonymous mappings.
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux patch: 6.1.178; patch: 7.1.5; 09cfefb7fa70c3af011b0db0a513fd80b2f18abc <76f88650763a35cbf1384c65d66d096fa31cc58d; patch: 0; patch: 6.12.97; 09cfefb7fa70c3af011b0db0a513fd80b2f18abc <018e9828eb523c638fa3d9bdf0fd4956b74555b2; 5.19; patch: 7.2; 09cfefb7fa70c3af011b0db0a513fd80b2f18abc <e483da960892c41fa7f0cf0d2fc2410d65a483d6; patch: 6.18.40; 09cfefb7fa70c3af011b0db0a513fd80b2f18abc <a65f49b6f7ece756394f8f0e85570020e7fd0e35; 09cfefb7fa70c3af011b0db0a513fd80b2f18abc <39bb21a4bff0d70058bf752d7b5aa2e2ccc864a9; patch: 6.6.145; 09cfefb7fa70c3af011b0db0a513fd80b2f18abc <e8a916579e427af32f2de8213dfa23c5df6e6664
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
An estate covering these products can be recorded in Patchlage. An advisory about them appears in the next morning's situation report.
- Linux — Linux
Does this concern one of your customers?
This page cannot answer that — it does not know your estate. Whoever has recorded their environments gets the answer the morning after publication, together with a paragraph they can forward to the customer unedited.
Try it for 28 daysPatchlage reports hits and suspected hits. About everything else this system says nothing — neither this page nor the situation report ever claims that an estate is safe.