CVE-2026-64394
CVE CVE-2026-64394EUVD EUVD-2026-48938Published 2026-07-25T08:50:39.000ZLast changed 2026-08-05T12:41:31.000ZCVSS 8.8
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: add a WRITE_DAC/WRITE_OWNER check to SMB2 SET_INFO SECURITY commit cc57232cae23 ("ksmbd: fix FSCTL permission bypass by adding a permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE") added a fp->daccess gate to fsctl_set_sparse and noted that "similar handle-level checks exist in other functions but are missing here." The SMB2 SET_INFO SECURITY arm is one of the missing ones, and the most security-relevant: smb2_set_info_sec() calls set_info_sec() with no per-handle access check. set_info_sec() (fs/smb/server/smbacl.c) re-permissions the file: it rewrites owner/group/mode via notify_change(), rewrites the POSIX ACL via set_posix_acl(), and on KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_ACL_XATTR shares removes and rewrites the Windows security descriptor via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(). Every other persistent-mutation arm of the sibling handler smb2_set_info_file() checks fp->daccess first (FILE_WRITE_DATA / FILE_DELETE / FILE_WRITE_EA / FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES); the SECURITY arm — which mutates the access control itself — is the only one with no gate. A client can therefore open a handle with FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES only (no FILE_WRITE_DAC / FILE_WRITE_OWNER) and use SMB2_SET_INFO with InfoType SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY to rewrite the file's DACL and owner, granting itself access the handle's daccess never carried. Unlike the FSCTL data arms this is a metadata/xattr operation, so there is no FMODE_WRITE VFS backstop — the missing fp->daccess check is the entire gate. Setting a security descriptor is the WRITE_DAC / WRITE_OWNER operation, so require at least one of those on the handle before re-permissioning the file. -EACCES is mapped to STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED by smb2_set_info().
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 <44df157a1183a7f746caa970c169255da5ac61f8; e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 <9ab2ffd3ed3d4ca1667c52de27026ddabc11e537; e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 <f56535db508ead8dec1c481ad93d7d8acd8f8f1e; e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 <e6aa731f1b4b3e08caebf66a99f04b22bdab2e99; patch: 6.18.39; 5.15; patch: 6.1.178; patch: 0; e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 <0848b1d8b403f530878195dcbe241a2fddb9d0e1; e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 <aae600cdaffc6d9ce97645f129799a103a97d06d; patch: 6.6.145; patch: 6.12.96; patch: 7.1.4; patch: 7.2-rc1
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
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- Linux — Linux
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