CVE-2026-64364
CVE CVE-2026-64364EUVD EUVD-2026-48908Published 2026-07-25T08:50:19.000ZLast changed 2026-08-05T12:41:06.000ZCVSS 8.8
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: multitouch: fix out-of-bounds bit access on mt_io_flags mt_io_flags is a single unsigned long, but mt_process_slot(), mt_release_pending_palms() and mt_release_contacts() use it as a per-slot bitmap indexed by the slot number. That slot number is only bounded by td->maxcontacts, which is taken from the device's ContactCountMaximum feature report and can be up to 255, not by BITS_PER_LONG. As a result, a multitouch device that advertises a large contact count makes set_bit()/clear_bit() operate past the mt_io_flags word and corrupt the adjacent members of struct mt_device. The sticky-fingers release timer is the easiest way to reach this. mt_release_contacts() runs for (i = 0; i < mt->num_slots; i++) clear_bit(i, &td->mt_io_flags); with num_slots == maxcontacts. For maxcontacts around 250 the loop clears the bits that overlap td->applications.next, zeroing that list head, and the list_for_each_entry() that immediately follows then dereferences NULL. The kernel panics from timer (softirq) context. On a KASAN build this shows up as a general protection fault in mt_release_contacts() with a null-ptr-deref at offset 0x58, which is offsetof(struct mt_application, num_received). The state is reachable from an untrusted USB or Bluetooth HID multitouch device; no local privileges are required. Store the per-slot active state in a separately allocated bitmap sized for maxcontacts, the same pattern already used for pending_palm_slots, and keep only MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING in mt_io_flags. The two "mt_io_flags & MT_IO_SLOTS_MASK" arming checks become bitmap_empty(td->active_slots, td->maxcontacts). Move MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING back to bit 0. It was bumped to bit 32 by the same commit to leave the low byte for the slot bits; with the slot bits gone it fits in bit 0 again, which also keeps it within the unsigned long on 32-bit.
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux 6.17.5 <6.18; 46f781e0d151844589dc2125c8cce3300546f92a <8813b0612275cc61fe9e6603d0ee019247ade6be; 46f781e0d151844589dc2125c8cce3300546f92a <6493ebf9489efef0105078377b973ab33d51af22; f32fea4c0234c971c12e46d76612cdc2dd4bb046 <e24918ee67c4dc3d20d4670750e46e9b160365f4; patch: 6.6.145; 6.18; patch: 6.18.39; 46f781e0d151844589dc2125c8cce3300546f92a <37daa8c96bd563d03150e23f094cb60703594a6d; 59bd04163e6451b9c7275277882ed9f4abfa2051; patch: 6.12.97; 77711d850bed75ae7142c3d1f22c1a8b4d049c33 <152983d87387f6a8ae72b73474cfa55fbcf1ec75; 6.12.55 <6.12.97; 5.15.196 <5.15.212; fc488f675344931ffab6a51c43691065ec006567 <12e90656e330ff8bbaf2f29c535fdb8a11cc6f55; 6.1.158 <6.1.178; patch: 5.15.212; 6acfe25968913788d30ec0eedd80178c4ea3f1d0 <b5c037d6b807017e74a115288f81bc9cd5a5aab8; 6.6.114 <6.6.145; patch: 6.1.178; d280c138e66be87d1fccfed42593f02fdb893905 <a6d5ce2e1a2d7bf189bde8a659d04b65f0b0725d; patch: 7.2-rc3; patch: 0; patch: 5.10.261; patch: 7.1.4; 5.10.246 <5.10.261
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
An estate covering these products can be recorded in Patchlage. An advisory about them appears in the next morning's situation report.
- Linux — Linux
Does this concern one of your customers?
This page cannot answer that — it does not know your estate. Whoever has recorded their environments gets the answer the morning after publication, together with a paragraph they can forward to the customer unedited.
Try it for 28 daysPatchlage reports hits and suspected hits. About everything else this system says nothing — neither this page nor the situation report ever claims that an estate is safe.