CVE-2026-64322
CVE CVE-2026-64322EUVD EUVD-2026-49034Published 2026-07-25T08:49:50.000ZLast changed 2026-08-05T12:40:59.000ZCVSS 7.8
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udf: validate sparing table length as an entry count, not a byte count udf_load_sparable_map() accepts a sparing table when sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen) > sb->s_blocksize is false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that must fit in the block. But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte sparingEntry elements: for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen); i++) { struct sparingEntry *entry = &st->mapEntry[i]; ... entry->origLocation ... } in udf_get_pblock_spar15() and udf_relocate_blocks(). A reallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever sizeof(*st) + N <= blocksize, yet the consumers index sizeof(*st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the block. On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in udf_get_pblock_spar15(); udf_relocate_blocks() additionally feeds the same length to udf_update_tag(), whose crc_itu_t() reads far past the block, and its memmove() through st->mapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds write. Validate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with struct_size().
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux 2.6.32.60 <2.6.33; 1df2ae31c724e57be9d7ac00d78db8a5dabdd050 <2d726135099313958f8975532a2e15322ff150ce; b1c5701ad6b3e5d21d16f65475651cfaaa41e7aa; patch: 6.6.145; a9f1af04f086656246f30354fb4564ce3b08c4a0; 1df2ae31c724e57be9d7ac00d78db8a5dabdd050 <7f7774b9da0ef17b87bfa238cf966ad0b3376150; 1df2ae31c724e57be9d7ac00d78db8a5dabdd050 <0a9b79a951cfd70a9d31ca01ae2d08a20bb730e9; 3.5; 9ae30e324a96d0328a575329d7a95a09b3318601; 1df2ae31c724e57be9d7ac00d78db8a5dabdd050 <7285276aa50d2839afb5957ffd491ad282dc8f72; patch: 6.12.96; 1df2ae31c724e57be9d7ac00d78db8a5dabdd050 <eeb0f3e193f8e523d03e4c9e084f6b4875f50e8e; 1df2ae31c724e57be9d7ac00d78db8a5dabdd050 <3ec997bd5508e9b25210b5bbec89031629cdb093; 1df2ae31c724e57be9d7ac00d78db8a5dabdd050 <2a219acb2ce674d99bbd1b7b35ed8c384dac7200; e240873cb4a9fd18de60a817100a96fe670d4359; patch: 7.2-rc1; 2.6.34.14 <2.6.35; 1df2ae31c724e57be9d7ac00d78db8a5dabdd050 <04f4599a9efb90992d072a814960edf0cd62805d; patch: 5.10.261; 3.2.23 <3.3; patch: 6.18.39; patch: 0; 3.0.37 <3.1; 3.4.5 <3.5; patch: 6.1.178; patch: 7.1.4; patch: 5.15.212; 4836ee563d65bb492f907cbe267a5761b9693e4d
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
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- Linux — Linux
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