CVE-2026-63979
CVE CVE-2026-63979EUVD EUVD-2026-45752Published 2026-07-19T14:56:03.000ZLast changed 2026-08-09T18:34:56.000ZCVSS 9.8
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: hand off the pinned file reference to accept_doit handshake_req_next() removes the request from the per-net pending list and drops hn_lock before handshake_nl_accept_doit() reads req->hr_sk->sk_socket and dereferences sock->file (once in FD_PREPARE() and again in get_file()). In that window a consumer running tls_handshake_cancel() followed by sockfd_put() (svc_sock_free) or __fput_sync() (xs_reset_transport) releases sock->file. sock_release() then runs sock_orphan(), zeroing sk_socket, and frees the struct socket. The accept-side code either reads NULL through sk_socket or chases freed memory. The submit-side sock_hold() does not prevent this. sk_refcnt protects struct sock, but struct socket and sock->file are independently refcounted via the file descriptor the consumer owns. Pinning sk leaves sock and sock->file unprotected. Retarget the accept-side dereferences at req->hr_file, which was pinned at submit time, instead of req->hr_sk->sk_socket->file. Pinning on its own is not sufficient: a consumer that cancels between handshake_req_next() returning and accept_doit reaching FD_PREPARE() takes the !remove_pending() branch in handshake_req_cancel() and drops hr_file before the accept side takes its own reference. Hand off an additional file reference inside handshake_req_next(), under hn_lock, so the accept side operates on a reference that no concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can revoke. FD_PREPARE() consumes that handed-off reference, either by transferring it to the new fd in fd_publish() or by dropping it in the cleanup destructor on error; the explicit get_file() that previously balanced FD_PREPARE() is therefore redundant and goes away. Update handshake_req_cancel_test2 and _test3 to simulate the FD_PREPARE() consumption with an fput() so the kunit file-count assertions stay balanced.
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux 6.4; patch: 7.1; 3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae <c06876d4fac38f35820946ee3b1be7d7da799cd4; patch: 7.0.12; 3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae <f4251190e58b209999c1ba9e6d2976136a1be055; patch: 6.18.44; patch: 0; 3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae <68eba6519cbd6359fb554a9720f3a3b6b2eba23f
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
An estate covering these products can be recorded in Patchlage. An advisory about them appears in the next morning's situation report.
- Linux — Linux
Does this concern one of your customers?
This page cannot answer that — it does not know your estate. Whoever has recorded their environments gets the answer the morning after publication, together with a paragraph they can forward to the customer unedited.
Try it for 28 daysPatchlage reports hits and suspected hits. About everything else this system says nothing — neither this page nor the situation report ever claims that an estate is safe.