CVE-2026-63911
CVE CVE-2026-63911EUVD EUVD-2026-45684Published 2026-07-19T14:55:16.000ZLast changed 2026-08-05T12:37:05.000ZCVSS 7.8
What the advisory describes
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: iptfs: reset runtime state when cloning SAs iptfs_clone_state() clones the IPTFS mode data with kmemdup(). This copies runtime objects which must not be shared with the original SA, including the embedded sk_buff_head, hrtimers, spinlock, and in-flight reassembly/reorder state. If xfrm_state_migrate() fails after clone_state() but before the later init_state() call has reinitialized those fields, the cloned state can be destroyed by xfrm_state_gc_task() with list and timer state copied from the original SA. With queued packets this lets the clone splice and free skbs owned by the original IPTFS queue, leading to use-after-free and double-free reports in iptfs_destroy_state() and skb release paths. Reinitialize the clone's runtime state before publishing it through x->mode_data. Because clone_state() now publishes a destroyable mode_data object before init_state(), take the mode callback module reference there. Avoid taking it again from __iptfs_init_state() for the same object.
Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.
Products the advisory names
These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.
- Linux — Linux patch: 6.18.35; 0e4fbf013fa566f274ce9b4ce698c75b1f998c52 <7f83d174073234839aea176f265e517e0d50a1d2; 6.14; patch: 7.1; 0e4fbf013fa566f274ce9b4ce698c75b1f998c52 <9327252e04626d4bb02ca8c0c108fbe8eabf0c5a; patch: 7.0.12; patch: 0; 0e4fbf013fa566f274ce9b4ce698c75b1f998c52 <dfb9f6cbfa9826655a49698cf90eb800fce2178e
The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.
Carried in the product catalogue
An estate covering these products can be recorded in Patchlage. An advisory about them appears in the next morning's situation report.
- Linux — Linux
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