CVE-2026-53397

CVE CVE-2026-53397EUVD EUVD-2026-45519Published 2026-07-19T12:01:58.000ZLast changed 2026-08-05T12:35:36.000ZCVSS 7.5

What the advisory describes

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs() and nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() each call nfs_stream_decode_acl() twice, first for NFS_ACL and then for NFS_DFACL. Each successful call transfers ownership of a freshly allocated posix_acl into argp->acl_access or argp->acl_default. If the first call succeeds but the second fails, the decoder returns false and argp->acl_access is left dangling. ACLPROC2_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfssvc_release_attrstat and ACLPROC3_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfs3svc_release_fhandle. Both only call fh_put() and have no knowledge of the ACL fields on argp. The posix_acl_release() pairs sat at the out: labels inside nfsacld_proc_setacl() and nfsd3_proc_setacl(), but svc_process() skips pc_func when pc_decode returns false, so that cleanup is unreachable on decode failure: svc_process_common() pc_decode() /* decode_setaclargs: false */ /* pc_func skipped */ pc_release() /* fh_put only -- ACLs leaked */ The orphaned posix_acl is leaked for the lifetime of the server. Fix by adding nfsaclsvc_release_setacl() and nfs3svc_release_setacl(), which release both argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default in addition to fh_put(), and wiring them as pc_release for their respective SETACL procedures. pc_release runs on every path svc_process() takes after decode, including decode failure, so the posix_acl_release() pairs are removed from the proc functions' out: labels to keep ownership in one place. This matches the existing release_getacl() pattern used by the sibling GETACL procedures.

Source: EUVD (ENISA), in the words of the advisory.

Products the advisory names

These come from the advisory itself, not from any check we performed.

• Linux — Linux a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055 <b94c4be77682aab06d65ca7296149e3bcfb37353; a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055 <887f92ceccf3eacd5f2402db21254d66372fae00; patch: 0; a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055 <a5b42c1e4ff2befaa6b96f7cbf32174751eba083; a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055 <bd69a825485168ef74e815ecb286754b570fdcc7; patch: 5.15.211; patch: 6.18.38; patch: 7.2-rc1; patch: 7.1.3; a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055 <136b416593f1349cf6f72c8e3d18f0f204ee8545; a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055 <1e96239fddcefacf6afe6c498357be68eacbcabc; patch: 5.10.260; patch: 6.12.95; patch: 6.1.177; patch: 6.6.144; a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055 <b2eb1ffd511d1b3c3e21122f97cbbccea411e277; a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055 <0853ac544c590880d797b04daa33fcb72b6be0e1; 2.6.13

The versions shown are the advisory's own. Patchlage compares no version numbers and derives no judgement from them — which version is installed is something a person has to look up.

Carried in the product catalogue

An estate covering these products can be recorded in Patchlage. An advisory about them appears in the next morning's situation report.

• Linux — Linux

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