CVE-2026-63895

CVE CVE-2026-63895EUVD EUVD-2026-45668Veröffentlicht 2026-07-19T14:55:05.000Z

Was das Advisory beschreibt

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of how many bytes were actually received: data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); ... ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len); if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len))) ret = -EFAULT; __ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req->actual, which on a short control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer -- uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS daemon. Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs: * dwc2 continues on req->actual < req->length for ep0 DATA OUT (short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path). * aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len < ep->ep.maxpacket. * renesas_usbf logs "ep0 short packet" and completes the request. * dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT. A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is a normal condition f_fs has to cope with. The sibling gadgetfs implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does this correctly via min(len, dev->req->actual) before copy_to_user(). This patch brings f_fs.c to the same safe pattern rather than trimming at a defensive layer. The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon (adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not reachable from unprivileged userspace. Linux host stacks normally reject short-wLength control OUTs before they reach the gadget, so reproducing this required a build that bypasses that host-side check. With the bypass in place, a 1-byte payload on a 64-byte Setup produces 63 bytes of non-canary slab residue in the daemon's read buffer. Fix by copying only ret (actually received) bytes to userspace.

Quelle: EUVD (ENISA), im Wortlaut der Meldung.

Produkte, die das Advisory nennt

Diese Angaben stammen aus der Meldung selbst, nicht aus einer Prüfung durch uns.

• Linux — Linux 2.6.35; patch: 7.0.12; patch: 6.6.143; ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0 <4e036c10e7f4df5d951c69cc3697bc8e209c6d02; ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0 <23c1f7deb9dd8447ecde749850676302aa1e2bd3; ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0 <607730a414773a7cbe3037a64a6c64e72689ff5e; ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0 <90ccf5fb63243fae1b4b3200f3310500500ecf2e; patch: 6.12.93; patch: 7.1; ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0 <e835bf9a055f71874065a40780ca5560b7df8b33; patch: 6.18.35; patch: 0; ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0 <88874a19b2b093bfaaa1c0090fa536c44da8c08b; ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0 <af32dbb2ca0b3d09271ab718d13857a457fa16f2; patch: 6.1.176; patch: 5.15.210

Die genannten Versionen sind die Angabe der Meldung. Patchlage vergleicht keine Versionsnummern und leitet aus ihnen keine Aussage ab — welche Version installiert ist, muss ein Mensch nachsehen.

Im Produktkatalog geführt

Für diese Produkte kann ein Bestand in Patchlage erfasst werden. Ein Advisory dazu erscheint am Morgen danach im Lagebericht.

• Linux — Linux

Patchlage meldet Treffer und Verdachtsfälle. Zu allem anderen sagt dieses System nichts — weder diese Seite noch der Lagebericht behauptet je, dass ein Bestand sicher ist.